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THE IMPECCABLE RESPONSE TO RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
POLICE DISSUADING SUSPECT TO SEEK LEGAL ADVICE 
Regina v. Dotchuk, County Court of Vancouver, No. CC842005 
March 1985 
The accused, appealed his conviction of "over 80 mlg.". At his trial 
he had testified that when he sat in front of the breathalyzer he had 
said, "I would like to call my lawyer. Do I have a right to do so?" 
The pol ice response had been "impeccable" said the appeal court. The 
officer had, pointing at a board up on the wall, said: "There is 
every name and every phone number of the lawyers in the Vancouver 
area. You're quite welcome to call". 
The County Court found that the response by police was impeccable only 
if taken in isolation. The accused had testified that the officer had 
raised his voice and had shown signs of annoyance. He also had 
claimed that police told him in addition, that it did not matter who 
he phoned, a lawyer could only tel 1 him one thing which was that he 
had to blow or else had to face a criminal charge. Not wanting to 
cause any hassles the accused had given samples of his breath. 
The County Court found as a fact that the accused had been intimidated 
not to call a lawyer, and said: 
" I n my view when an accused expresses a wish to call a 
lawyer under such circumstances he should be afforded that 
right by way of access to a telephone and a telephone book 
without intervention or comment by the police". 
Comment by pol ice that legal consul tat ion would be of no avail, in 
addition to the behaviour of the officer, amounted to an infringement 
of the accused's right to counsel. No informed public would approve 
of the improper dissuasion by police for the accused to exercise that 
right. Consequently acceptance of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The analyses evidence 
should have been disallowed held the appeal court. Appeal was allowed 
and the conviction was quashed. 
* * * * * 
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
ARMED ROBBERY - USING A FIREARM IN THE COMMISSION OF AN INDICTABLE 
OFFENCE - POINTING FIREARM - UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON 
Regina v. Krug, Supreme Court of Canada, October 1985 
In the mid seventies the Supreme Court considered whether it was 
appropriate in law to convict a Mr. Kienapple* of rape as wel 1 as 
carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of fourteen years while both 
charges arose from one act of sexual intercourse. By means of complex 
(and in spots somewhat confusing) reasons for judgment, the Supreme 
Court of Canada said "No". It reasoned that if the accused was con-
victed of rape (considering that sexual intercourse was an essential 
ingredient of that crime) and the age of the girl proved, then there 
was nothing left to be tried for the crime of carnal knowledge of an 
under 14 year old girl. If both convictions were appropriate the 
Court would in essence have said that multiple convictions may arise 
from one act of wrongdoing. That, the Court held, would. be a form of 
double jeopardy and Kienapple stood convicted of rape only. 
The Kienapple decision caused overlapping offences to receive similar 
consideration as a combination of charges to which the doctrine of 
double jeopardy would apply. Prior to this decision dual convictions 
for one delict were not uncommon. For instance impaired driving and 
"over 80 mlg." arising from one act of driving occurred· regularly. 
Dual convictions arising from one act of wrongdoing was appropriate as 
long as the offences were separate and distinct from one another. 
However, when the lesser of two alleged offences arising from one 
incident is an offence included in the main offence, a conviction for 
that lesser offence was and is improper if the accused stands convic-
ted of the main and more serious offence. To determine if one offence 
is included in another more serious offence is rather simple**. The 
second offence must be an offence of necessity to commit the main 
offence; or the second offence is included in the definition of the 
main offence; or the second offence is included in the wording of the 
indictment in Tespect to the main offence. Any offence that is not so 
included is a separate and distinct offence. 
Convictions for separate and distinct offences arising from one inci-
dent, was quite permissible. The Kienapple decision abolished this 
pr~ctice, or at least, included in the dictum described above offences 
that overlap with one another. 
Defence counsel have relied on the Kienapple principle many times when 
their clients charged with armed robbery, were also charged with using 
a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence (s. 83 C.C.). In 
1982, approximately one month before the Charter came into effect, 
* Kienapple v. The Queen [1975] S.C.R. 729. 
** See section 589 C.C. 
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the Supreme Court of Canada addressed this very question in McQuigan 
v. The Queen*. McQuigan who had attempted to rob a variety store 
proprietor with a loaded shotgun, argued that his conviction for that 
offence made an additional conviction of "using a firearm in the 
commission of an indictable offence" improper. The Supreme Court of 
Canada held that Parliament, by providing for an additional one year 
in gaol to the penalty imposed for the indictable offence arising from 
the same event, made it clear in s. 83 C.C. that to curb the menace of 
use of firearms in the commission of crime, the Kienapple principle 
does not apply in such cases. 
The same issue was brought before the Supreme Court of Canada in post 
Charter days by means of this Krug case. Krug was apparently unhappy 
about a financial institution repossessing his cars. He went with a 
loaded rifle to the compound where the vehicles were kept and attemp-
ted to steal the cars by pointing the rifle at an employee. Police 
disarmed him and Krug was charged with: ( 1) attempted armed robbery; 
(2) using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence; (3) 
having unlawful possession of a weapon (dangerous to the public 
peace); and (4) unlawfully pointing a firearm. He pleaded guilty to 
attempted armed robbery and was convicted upon trial of using a fire-
arm in the commission of an indictable offence and pointing a firearm. 
The accused appealed the convictions except the one of attempted armed 
robbery. He did not only depend on the Kienapple principle that no 
multiple convictions must result from one delict, but also on s. 7 of 
the Charter. He argued that the multiple convictions were contrary to 
the principles of fundamental justice. 
The Supreme Court of Canada reasoned that s. 83 C.C. refers to "the 
use" of a firearm. If one commits a theft while armed, he commits 
armed robbery. The weapon, however, does not need to be a firearm. 
The offence created in s. 83 C.C. is separate and distinct from armed 
robbery, as the use of a firearm is an ingredient additional to what 
needs to be proved for a conviction of armed robbery. In other words, 
if one steals while armed with a firearm, he commits armed robbery 
only. If he uses the firearm while committing the theft, an addition-
al conviction~er s. 83 C.C. is appropriate and does not breach the 
meaning of s. 7 of the Charter. The very use of the firearm in this 
case, was the "pointing" and therefore (in accordance with the 
Kienapple principle) the conviction for that offence could not stand. 
The Supreme Court of Canada demonstrated (by allowing the appeal in 
relation to the pointing of the firearm) and warned that where the 
* 
See [1982] 1 S.C.R. 284. 
publication. 
Also see page 25 of Volume 5 of this 
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actual use of a firearm is an essential ingredient of an indictable 
offence:--t"hen it would be improper to also convict under s. 83 C.C. 
As indicated above, armed robbery does not have the ~ of a firearm 
as an essential ingredient. 
Accused ' s appeal in regards to pointing a 
firearm was al lowed. In respect to the 
other matters his appeal was dismissed. 
Comment: The Kienapple decision was handed down in 1975 and has often 
been applied and argued in criminal proceedings. It has also been 
the topic of many articl es by legal scholars. Yet it has appeared 
difficult at times for the Supreme Court of Canada to give greater 
clarification to the principle it created. 
In this case the Supreme Court of Canada again explained and applied 
its own Kienapple creation. It reasoned and reasoned and did, in my 
view, tell us that an additional conviction arising from one act of 
wrongdoing is improper where the commission of the main offence (first 
conviction) cannot be completed without committing the offence(s) of 
which the accused was convicted in addition. 
If my interpretation of this Krug decision is correct, we have nearly 
come full circle and the old method to determine if multiple convic-
tions arising from one incident are appropriate does not seem as 
absolete as we thought it was for the last decade. However, though 
that method may not be completely obsolete, neither do I believe it to 
be fool proof. For instance, Kienapple (as the law then was) raped a 
female person who happened to be under 14 years old. When rape was 
proven there was nothing left to be tried for the carnal knowledge 
charge. Another example is a person driving with a blood-alcohol 
level of 120 mlg. who is consequently convicted of impaired driving. 
Nothing would have to be proved in addition to show the offence of 
"over 80 mlg.". Yet, carnal knowledge was not an offence included in 
rape and "over 80 mlg." is not an offence included in impaired driv-
ing. The Kienapple decision has prohibited multiple convictions in 
these overlapping offences. However, if you read the Kienapple deci-
sion it was supposed to do more. The decision appears designed to 
remedy issues that are not addressed by applying the "included offen-
ces" test. Reading the Krug case it leads you to wonder if the 
Kienapple principle is now of lesser significance than it appeared to 
be in 1975. 
* * * * * 
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IS EVIDENCE THAT TWO SAMPLES OF BREATH WERE TAKEN, 
A CONDITION OF ADMISSIBILITY OF A CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSES. 
Regina v. Schlegel, B. C. Court of Appeal, Vancouver CA 003000, 
October 1985 
Mr. Schlegel, the accused, was charged with "over 80 mlg.". The 
arresting officer was the only witness at trial. He testified how the 
qualified technician had demanded "he (the accused) provide a sample 
of his breath". In describing how the accused complied the officer 
attested: "He supplied a sample of his breath ••• " (singular). 
The certificate of analyses indicated that two s~mples were analysed. 
This discrepancy, argued defence counsel, amounted to "evidence to the 
contrary" which prevented the certificate from being proof of the 
accused blood alcohol level at the time of driving (s.237(l)(c)C.C.). 
The Provine ial and County Courts did not buy the accused's arguments 
and he took his plight to the B. C. Court of Appeal. 
The County Court Judge had recognized that the certificate itself 
showed that two samples, as required by law, were analyzed. This was 
sufficient evidence to prove that the prerequisite conditions to 
admissibility of the certificate in evidence were met. 
The accused argued before the B. C. Court of Appeal that the County 
Court Judge's reasoning was wrong in law. How can a Court consider 
any part of a document as evidence before it has admitted that docu-
ment in evidence? In other words, "Can the Court have any regard to 
the certificate in deciding on its admissibility"? The accused relied 
on a decision by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal* which stipulated 
that before the certificate of analyses can be admitted in evidence 
there must be evidence that a demand was made and that more than one 
sample of breath was taken. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal agreed that only a certificate that indi-
cates that more than one breath sample was analyzed is capable of 
proving the blood alcohol level at the time of driving. However, the 
court disagreed with its New Brunswick counterpart that a judge, in 
deciding on the admissibility of a document, may not have regard to 
its content. There are many precedents that support a judge to 
consider the content of a document when considering its admissibility 
in evidence. 
* R. v. Richard 60 N.B.R. (2d) 
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If this was not so, the legislation allowing proof by cert i ficates 
would be defeated in respect to its intent. The officer's testimony 
proved that a sample of breath was taken. The document proved that at 
least two samples of breath were analyzed. If proof of two samples 
was prerequisite to admissibility of the certificate in evidence, the 
legislation would be for naught, reasoned the B. C. Court of Appeal. 
The accused's suggest ion that evidence of the giving of samples of 
breath are prerequisite to the admissibility of the certificate would 
amount to reading into the statute 
" technical requirements which do not flow from the 
language used by Parliament; and by ignoring the mischief 
aimed at by the sections". 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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PERJUROUS ALIBI EVIDENCE - CROWN FAILING TO REBUT 
IS CHARGE OF PERJURY PROPER? 
Crdic v. The Queen 19 C.C.C. (3d) 289, Supreme Court of Canada 
Pol ice Officers testified how they stopped the accused in the early 
evening hours of a certain date. A demand was made of him for samples 
of breath which resulted in charges of impaired driving and "over 80 
mlg". The accused testified and said that at the time the officers 
claimed he was driving, he was home with his daughter. He said he had 
been stopped that date around noon, but not in the early evening 
hours. His daughter also testified backing up the accused's alibi. 
The trial judge, referring to the defence tes t imony, said he was sure 
that perjury had been conunitted, but added that the matter was not his 
responsibility to deal with. However, he acquitted the accused when 
the Crown failed to ask for an adjournment to rebut the apparent per-
jurous evidence. The accused was then charged with perjury. 
The accused raised a unique defence to the perjury allegation. He 
argued that the trial judge had adjudicated the matter in respect of 
his testimony. The acquittal was proof that, at least his defence 
testimony had created a reasonable doubt. "In view of that adjudica-
tion the courts are estopped from trying that very issue again" argued 
the accused. When the B. C. Court of Appeal did not agree with the 
accused, he took his case to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
By a majority judgment (5 to 4) the Supreme Court of Canada allowed 
the accused's appeal and ordered an acquittal on the allegation of 
perjury. The only defenc e the accused raised in his impaired driving 
trial was alibi. The acquittal came as a result of that defence and 
the alibi matter was therefore resolved in favour of the accused. The 
Crown prosecuted the accused for perjury by adducing the exact same 
evidence as it did at the impaired driving trial. The Court held that 
the matter could, on that basis, not be litigated again. 
Our conunon law dictates that if one conunits perjury the Courts are not 
estopped from trying the matter the witness testified to again. How-
ever, in addition to what the accused's testimony, there must be evi-
dence sufficient to prove the accused knowingly gave false testimony 
with the intent to mislead the court. Therefore, the defence the 
accused raised in respect to perjury would not have been available to 
him had the Crown adduced evidence in addition to what was presented 
at trial. If the evidence of the officers had not been capable to 
overcome the accused's per jurous testimony in one trial, the same 
testimony should not be subject to adjudication in subsequent proceed-
ings. In other words, if there is at the trial for perjury evidence 
in addition to what was adduced at the original trial, the Courts are 
not estopped from trying the matter again. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada reasoned that the Crown has an additional 
matter to prove to show per jury. The Crown must show it had been 
reasonably diligent in rebutting the alleged perjurous evidence as an 
innnediate response at trial, or it must show that no rebuttal evidence 
was available at the time of the first trial. In this case the 
additional evidence the Crown adduced during the perjury trial was 
available at the time of the impaired driving trial. Therefore the 
Accused's appeal was allowed. 
Acquittal entered. 
Conunent: There is something about this judgment that seems out of 
step with logic and equality. Is it too simple to reason that the 
crime of per jury ought to be complete when a person deliberately and 
knowingly gives false testimony with the intent to mislead the Court? 
Where is the relevance in whether the Court believed the perjurer; or 
that the other party to the proceedings applying reasonable diligence 
could have rebutted the perjurous testimony; or to give significance 
to the point in time the Crown became aware that the testimony was 
perjurous. 
Does this mean that a witness can perjure himself with impunity as 
long as "the other party" can rebut his evidence and is aware of the 
falsehood, while the witness who perjured himself and is discovered 
subsequent to the proceedings, is criminally liable? 
If I have interpreted the reasons for judgment in this Crdic case 
correctly, the Court process will be less accurate and reliable in 
respect to fact finding. Should anyone infer that these comments are 
slanted in favour of the prosecution's side of the process, he or she 
should consider that the same principle may apply to Crown witnesses 
who perjure themselves. 
* * * * * 
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MEANING OF "REMOVED OR OBLITERATED" IDENTIFICAION 
NUMBER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE OR PARTS OF IT -
PRESUMPTION OF GUILTY KNOWLEDGE 
Regina v. Hodgkins, 19 C.C.C. (3d) 109 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused was found to be in possession of a Harley Davidson engine, 
worth about $500. He claimed to have purchased it from a party 
unknown for $35. The identification number was altered by changing a 
"C" to an 11011 , and a "3" to an 11811 • 
The law presumes (s. 312(2) C.C.) that a person in possession of such 
parts the identification number of which is in whole or in part 
"obliterated" or "removed" knows (in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary) that such parts were obtained by the commission of an 
indictable offence and that he has knowledge of that fact. 
The trial judge had held that the presumption did not apply, as the 
numbers were altered and not "obliterated or removed". The Ontario 
Court of Appeal did not agree with him and held that changing the 
identification numbers is what Parliament intended to be included in 
the presumption of guilty knowledge. Said the Court: 
" the word 'obliterate' fairly comprehends the destruc-
tion of the integrity of the original vehicle identifica-
tion number by altering some of the numbers and letters 
comprising it to produce a new and spurious vehicle 
identification number by the method used to accomplish 
that result in the present case." 
Crown's appeal allowed . 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
MOBILE BREATHALYZER - NO TELEPHONE - NO COUNSEL 
Regina v. Blades, County Court of Westminster, No. X015010, October 
1985 
Police were approximately 10 miles from their office with the "BAT 
Mobile". The accused was s topped and as he showed symptoms of impair-
ment, a demand for breath samples was made. The accused was informed 
of his rights to counsel but made no attempts to exercise that right. 
The pol ice officers had not done anything by gesture, demeanor or 
words to discourage or hinder the accused to seek legal advice. 
However, had the accused wanted to contact a lawyer prior to giving 
the breath samples, he could not have done so from the location where 
the samples were taken. The accused testified that he realized this. 
His lawyer submitted that it would have been useless to make any 
specific request; therefore, the circumstances and the setting had 
deprived his client of his right to counsel. 
Recently the Supreme Court of Canada decided in the Therens* case that 
a person under demand to give samples of breath is detained and must 
consequently be informed of his right to counsel. Therens had not 
been so informed and our highest court held that the infringement 
prevented the certificate of analysis from being included in the 
evidence to be considered. Defence counsel in this Blades' case 
strongly argued that the claimed infringement of his client's right to 
counsel left the Court no alternative but to comply with the precedent 
set in the Therens decision. 
The County Court Judge (who heard the accused ' s appeal in relation to 
"over 80 rnlg. ") held that the accused ' s right to counsel had not been 
infringed. The accused had not attempted to exercise his right and 
the police had not interfered with that right. 
Accused's conviction was upheld, 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Therens (1985) 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 - Also see page 1 of Volume 
21 of this publication. 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
WHO WAS DRIVING? - ADMISSIBILITY OF TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE 
DURING TRIAL - OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE 
The Queen v. Stegmaier, Robertson and King, County Court of Westmin-
ster, No. X014607, September 1985 
From the reasons for judgement it appears that during a trial it had 
been essential to prove "who was driving and who was not". The two 
accused apparently were witnesses at that trial and were consequently 
charged with obstructing justice. The Crown sought to put the trans-
cripts of their testimony in evidence and a voir dire was held whether 
the transcripts were admissible. 
Defence counsel argued that admitting the evidence would be contrary 
to section 13 of the Charter. That section provides that no evidence 
a witness gives may be used in any other proceedings to criminate that 
witness, other than for the purpose of supporting an allegation of 
perjury or having given contradictory evidence. In this case obstruc-
ting justice was alleged. 
The County Court Judge reasoned that the provisions of the Charter 
were designed not to protect a person where the giving of the original 
testimony constitutes the very offence alleged in subsequent proceed-
ings. 
For instance, if the answer to a question put to a witness involves 
him in an offence or renders him liable, then the Charter protects the 
witness. However, where the giving of the evidence constitutes a 
crime then the Charter, despite its specificity (perjury or contradic-
tory evidence), does not protect the witness, held the court. 
In this case the Crown apparently (the judgement is not specific) 
alleged that the two accused had obstructed justice by their testimony 
given at a trial at which the Crown attempted to establish who was 
driving. Said the Court: 
" I have come to the conclusion ••• that it (the exemp-
tion from the Charter protection) can be extended •.. where 
in fact it is the giving of the testimony that constitute 
t he offence." 
Transcripts admitted in evidence. 
* * * * * 
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YOUTH COURT ONLY HAS JURISDICTION OVER "YOUNG PERSONS" 
MUST THE CROWN IN EACH CASE PROVE AGE BEFORE COURT HAS JURISDICTION? 
Between R ..• and C ... B. C. Court of Appeal CA002902, November 1985 
The accused youths and other young persons were charged under the 
provisions of the Young Offenders Act with assault causing bodily 
harm. One of the mothers testified before a plea was taken that her 
accused son was 15 years old on the day of the alleged assault. 
Counsel for the others conceded that their clients were "young 
persons" on that date. Al 1 this was noted on the "information" and 
after pleas of "not guilty" a trial date was set. Having heard all 
the evidence the trial judge convicted the youth whose mother had 
testified as to his age; he acquitted the others as there was no proof 
that they were in fact young persons. In other words, defence 
counsel 1 s admission of age was inadequate for the Court to assume 
jurisdiction. 
The Crown appealed this decision of the Youth Court to the B. C. Court 
of Appeal. It was obvious that the trial judge had relied on a deci-
sion by the B. C. Supreme Court in 1982* under the Juvenile Del in-
quents Act. The Supreme Court held that proof ·of age is not only 
fundamental to jurisdiction, but is, in addition, an ingredient of the 
allegation to be proven by the Crown. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal indicated it to be pointless to determine if 
the decision regarding the Juvenile Delinquents Act by the B. C. 
Supreme Court was correct as "the language of the Young Offenders Act 
is completely different". That the accused youths were "young 
persons" was established when the proceedings commenced said the B.C. 
Court of Appeal. Whether, in addition, the Crown should have proven 
the ages of the accused young persons (whose lawyer conceded them to 
be so) the Court of Appeal said: 
"In my opinion it did not". 
Verdicts of "guilty" entered. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Hernandez, Hernandez and Skinner, Nelson Registry S.C. 287/82 
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MUST "EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY" TO THE PRESUMPTION OF 
EQUALIZATION IN RELATION TO BLOOD-ALCOHOL LEVEL, CREATE 
A REASONABLE DOUBT ONLY? 
Regina v. Hoffman, County Court of Vancouver, No. CC850747, October 
1985 
By means of a certificate of analyses and testimony by the breathaly-
zer technician, the Crown proved that the accused's blood-alcohol 
level was "over 80 mlg." at the time she drove her car. In rebuttal 
to the presumption that the blood-alcohol levels at the time of 
analyses and driving were the same, witnesses testified that the 
accused had only one glass of beer and 8 oz. of wine. This, a defence 
expert swore, is an inadequate quantity of alcoholic beverages to 
attain a reading of "80 mlg." let alone the recorded readings of 130 
and 140 mlg. The trial judge had been satisfied that the breathalyzer 
had accurately analyzed the breath samples and held that rebuttal 
evidence had failed to rebut the presumption of equalization. The 
accused appealed the conviction of "over 80 mlg.". 
The County Court Judge observed that the trial judge had not rejected 
the evidence of the defence witnesses, nor did he say whether the 
testimony had raised a reasonable doubt. He said to be satisfied upon 
the technician's testimony that the instrument was working properly. 
He should have considered the credibility of the rebuttal evidence and 
whether it had raised a reasonable doubt. 
New trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
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DANGEROUS OFFENDER 
PROOF AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
The Queen v. Burroughs, Vancouver County Court, No. CC84 l 565, 
Vancouver June 1985 
Within four months, in 1979, the 29 year old Burroughs committed three 
rapes in a public park. Besides threatening the vie tims with and 
subjecting them to violence, he took all the funds they had in their 
possession. He served a sentence of 4 1/2 years for those offences. 
Very shortly after his release, he grabbed a young woman in the same 
park, showed her a knife and promised that any screaming would result 
in him slitting her throat. He then forced her to perform oral sex 
with him and forced intercourse. She then had to perform fellatio 
again and when it was al 1 over he took the $12 she had on her. When 
he entered a plea of guilty in relation to this sexual assault the 
Crown applied that Burroughs be declared a dangerous offender under 
s. 689(1) c.c. 
The Crown, in support of its application, introduced the convictions 
aad all of the circumstances of the rapes in 1979. It also adduced 
evidence of Burroughs' psychiatric therapy during his prison term. He 
was described by the medical staff as being a pathological liar; 
insincere; lacking remorse or shame, having poor judgement and failing 
to learn from experience; he has a capability to feel sorry, but only 
for himself. As Burroughs' prognosis was very poor, he was removed 
from the group program at the request of medical staff. Although the 
defence psychiatrist was critical that no individual therapy was 
attempted, he said that a fter a five year period of treatment Mr. 
Burroughs could "possibly be cured, not probably be cured". 
To determine if the Crown had adduced evidence sufficient to support 
its application for Burroughs to be placed in custody as a dangerous 
offender, the Court reviewed what the Crown had to prove; the burden 
of proof, and what in fact the evidence supported. 
To show that a person is a dangerous offender the Crown must "estab-
lish to the satisfaction of the Court" (which means must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt): 
1. that the conviction upon which the application under s. 687(b) 
C.C. is made, is a "serious personal injury offence"; and; 
2. that the subject has demonstrated by his conduct (including his 
conduct when he committed the offences) that he cannot control 
his sexual impulses and that there is a likelihood that because 
of this failure, he will again cause evil, pain or injury to 
other persons. 
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The Court concluded that the offence of which he was convicted and the 
circumstances of that offence made it a "serious personal injury 
offence". Considering the evidence of the psychiatric experts and 
Mr. Burrough's response to the treatment he received the Court thought 
it likely that he would not be able to control his sexual impulses and 
would commit a similar offence in the future. Consequently he was 
declared a dangerous offender. 
Due to the unpredictability of the results, if any, from treatment, 
the sentence was one of indeterminate detention. 
* * * * * 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMPTION THAT PERSON w1IO POSSESSES 
COUNTERFEIT MONEY HAS KNOWLEDGE THAT THE CURRENCY IS COUNTERFEIT 
Regina v. Burge, County Court of Yale, Kamloops CCC914 
May 1985 
The accused was charged with possessing and uttering a counterfeit 
U.S. $100 bill. At the outset of his trial the accused questioned the 
constitutional validity of the sections under which he was charged 
(s. 408 and 410 C.C.). These sections in essence say that if one 
does possess or utter counterfeit money without being able to prove 
some lawful justification or excuse, then he or she is guilty of an 
indictable offence. This, claimed the accused, contravenes the 
presumption of innocence (s. ll(d) Charter). The meaning of that 
presumption is that the Crown must prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt while the accused has the right to remain silent. 
Since the Charter came into effect the Courts have held that a statute 
or common law presumption of fact or guil t can only survive the 
"constitutional test", if the facts prerequisite to the presumption 
make the presumed fact a consequential probability. 
Applying this test to sections 408 and 410 of the Criminal Code, one 
could encounter some problems. For instance, if a person, who is not 
an expert on currency, receives a counterfeit bill in the normal 
course of his business and passes it on again, he hardly can be 
considered to have a criminal intent. Therefore, possession or utter-
ing do not have guilty knowledge (the kernel requisite ingredient to 
the crime) as a probability. In other words there is no rational 
connection between the proven (possession and uttering) and the 
presumed facts (guilty knowledge). The Court concluded that the 
sections (408 and 410 C.C.) do contravene the presumption of innocence 
and are therefore unconstitutional. 
* * * * * 
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ROAD CHECKS - RANDOM STOPPING OF CARS TO FERRET OUT IMPAIRED DRIVERS -
LAWFULNESS OF POLICE ACTION 
Regina v. Dedman, Supreme Court of Canada 
20 c.c.c. (3d) 97 
Mr. Dedman was stopped in a police spot check, which was part of a 
much publicized police action to reduce the devastation drinking 
drivers cause on our highways. There was nothing about Mr. Dedman' s 
driving that made police stop him. He simply happened to come along 
when one of the officers involved in the road check was clear to stop 
the next car. 
A strong smell indicated that Mr. Dedman had been drinking and it was 
demanded of him to give a sample of his breath in a roadside device 
(A.L.E.R.T.). He made several apparently fake attempts to blow but 
whatever he donated was inadequate to analyze. He was not arrested 
but was issued an appearance notice for failing or refusing to blow. 
The Ontario Provincial Court* acquitted the accused and held that 
police had neither a statutory nor common law authority to pull cars 
over at random. Therefore the grounds to make the demand for the 
breath sample were derived from an unauthorized act by the police and 
consequently the accused was not a person upon whom a demand could be 
made. 
The Supreme Court of Ontario also found that the police had no author-
ity to stop the accused in a road check and held that the accused had 
a reasonable excuse for failing to give a sample of breath. 
Upon further appeal the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the accused 
had no excuse to fail to blow. It was itmnaterial whether the officers 
were within the lawful performance of their duty. Stopping the 
accused was not a crime or tort. The accused did stop, and was found 
to have been drinking. The demand was properly made and was compel-
ling on the accused. The Court set the acquittal aside and Mr. Dedman 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Of the seven Justices deciding the case four decided that Mr. Dedman's 
appeal should be dismissed. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed 
with the Ontario Court of Appeal despite the fact that both Courts 
reached the same conclusion. The fact that the accused had stopped 
did not alter the legal basis which justified the police action. A 
policeman's actions may be unlawful if unauthorized despite the fact 
* R. v. Dedman. See page 8 of Volume 2 of this publication. 
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they did not amount to a crime or a tort. When we test the lawfulness 
of a police officer's action we do so by examining if there is a 
specific provision in statute or common l aw that authorized the taking 
of the action. This is necessary because of "the authoritative and 
coercive character of police action". 
The public may be uncertain about police powers. If, therefore, some-
one complies with an unauthorized direction of a policeman that 
compliance cannot be regarded as voluntary. It then follows that if 
the road check was unauthorized by statute or common law, the stopping 
of Mr. Dedman was unlawful and affected the validity of the subsequent 
demand for a breath sample, reasoned the majority of our highest 
court. 
The Court observed that it was in the public ' s interest to comply with 
the signals by police officers. In many cases it is for the protec-
tion of the persons travelling in the vehicle. Nonetheless: 
"A person should not be penalized for comp! iance with a 
signal to stop by having it treated as a waiver or renun-
ciation of rights, or as supplying a want of authority for 
the stop" 
said the Court. 
But was the road check which was part of a police programme to reduce 
impaired driving, unlawful? The Ontario Highway Traffic Act, like its 
counterparts in other provinces, provides that motorists must obey 
directions given by police officers and it also provides that a driver 
is obliged to give his driver's licence and other vehicle documents 
upon demand to a policeman for the purpose of inspection. 
The Crown conceded it could not rely on the former provision for an 
authorization for road checks to find impaired drivers and the Court 
rejected the notion that the duty imposed on a driver to produce docu-
ments gives a power to a pol ice officer. A power must be expressly 
conferred, held the Court. If the stopping is for the purpose of 
inspecting documents, that does not include the purpose for which the 
accused was stopped. Drinking drivers were the principal targets and 
the inspection of document was no more than a means to an end. 
The Court then turned to the common law and statutory duties of police 
officers. Of co,urse these are to preserve peace, prevent crime, and 
apprehend perpetrators. In this case police had interfered with the 
accused's "liberty" to drive freely on the streets. However, that 
"liberty" to drive is not a fundamental or constitutional liberty. It 
is a licensed activity subject to many regulations for the protection 
of all. Although the random stopping of cars seems, on the surface, 
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to be unauthorized 1n the absence of a specific prov1s1on for it the 
Court said: 
"I do not think there can be any doubt that it fell within 
the general scope of the duties of a police officer to 
prevent crime and to protect 1 i fe and property by the 
control of traffic. These were the very objects of the 
. • • prograrrnne, which is a measure to improve the deter-
rence and detection of impaired driving, a notorious cause 
of injury and death". 
The Court recognized the inconvenience to the law abiding public and 
the objectionable nature of a random check. Weighing this off against 
the necessity for these measures to ensure public safety, the practice 
of the road checks is not an unreasonable interference with the 
public's liberty. 
Said the Court: 
" I would accordingly hold that there 
authority for the random vehicle stop 





Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
* R.I.D.E. programme - Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere. 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
DETENTION - TO BE INFORMED OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Regina v, Rosenbush and Rosenbush, B. 
June 1985. 
'•' C. Court of Appeal, No . CA002265, 
The two accused are a middle aged married couple who performed a courier 
service for a cousin who imported cocaine. They travelled from Vancouver 
Island to Seattle and met as arranged, two men who turned . two large suit-
cases over to them. Unbeknownst to the accused they and these men were at 
all times under police surveillance. The phone call by means of which Mr. 
Rosenbush received his instruct ions for the trip had been intercepted and 
police had alerted the Canadian Customs officials. When the couple arrived 
at the border they declared some children's clothing and were sent to the 
office. The custom's officer who dealt with the accused had already been 
told by his superior what the accused were carrying. 
The accused were taken to an inspection room while the suitcases were 
searched in another room. The conversation between the Custom's officer 
and the accused was very general, casual, and mainly about Custom exemp-
tions. The officer was then informed that a l arge quantity of cocaine was 
found in the linings of the suitcases (street value of $1.6 mill ion). He 
was instructed to question the accused about the origin of the suitcases 
and then arrest them. 
The accused said they bought the suitcases in a secondhand store on 
Vancouver Island. This, of course, was a blatant lie and helped to show 
that the accused had knowledge that the suitcases contained contraband. 
After this lie, the accused were arrested. 
When tried for importing cocaine, the trial judge had allowed the conversa-
tion between the Custom's officer and the accused in evidence. He held the 
accused were not detained until arrested. Therefore, there was no need to 
inform them of their rights to counsel. Furthermore, the statements were 
voluntarily given. The accused were convicted and appealed to the B. C. 
Court of Appeal. 
Since the trial of the accused, but prior to the B. C. Court of Appeal 
dealing with their appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada made its landmark 
decision in relation to "detention" in the Therens case*. That decision 
rendered erroneous the ruling by the trial judge that the accused were not 
detained when they had their apparent innocuous conversation with the 
Custom's officer. This, particularly when they told the damaging lie about 
the su.itcases. The Custom's officer knew about the cocaine and was going 
to effect the arrest. He simply delayed the arrest, likely to avoid having 
* R. v. Therens. See page 1, Volume 21 o f this publication - 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481. 
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to comply with his duty to inform the accused of their rights . The B. C. 
Court of Appeal held that considering all the circumstances and the 
knowledge on the part of the Custom's officia l about the contraband meant 
that the accused were detained · when they made their damaging statement. 
Their rights had consequently been infringed deliberately and not innocent-
ly or in good faith. 
The remaining question was whether admitting the statements would bring the 
administration of just ice into disrepute. The B. C. Court of Appeal held 
that the deliberate actions of the Custom's officials and the lack of good 
faith would cause disrepute to the administration of justice if the state-
ments were allowed. 
Accused's appeal allowed - new trial ordered. 
Comment 
The Therens decision caused concern that the Courts would consider that 
decision to have created a strict exclusionary rule. The B. C. Court of 
Appeal did not apply the strict rule and seemed to have gone out of its way 
to dispel that. At least, the Court appears to let it be known that it 
will not apply the rule strictly. 
The B. C. Justices unanimously reiterated what they held · in the Collins 
case*: 
When we are deciding whether or not a party who wished 
evidence to be excluded has established that its admission 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute 
we must heed the lessons drawn from our past and from the 
experience of others. The major lesson is that the admin-
istration of justice will not be held in high regard if we 
regularly exclude evidence. I agree with the trial judge 
that the cases in which the evidence should be excluded 
will be rare." 
(the emphasis is the Court ' s) 
This message is quite clear and leaves one to infer that the B. C. Court of 
Appeal does consider that their decision in Collins did survive the 
Therens ' decision by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
* R. v. Collins. Page 1 , Volume 12 of this publication - 0983) S 
c.c.c. (3d) 141. 
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In other words, the B. C. Court of Appeal did apply the new "detention" 
definition but did indicate not to be prepared to hold that the Therens' 
decision created a strict exclusionary rule. 
On September the 18th, the B. C. Court of Appeal again had an opportunity 
to relate its interpretation of the Therens decision by the Supreme Court 
of Canada when it gave its reason for judgement in the following drug case: 
Regina v. Gladstone - B. C. Court of Appeal - CA 000941 - September 1985*. 
Gladstone arrived at the Vancouver Airport in May of 1982 (one mon th after 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect) from Lima. He did fit 
the description of and was named on the "watch for" list. Custom's offi-
cers referred him to a secondary clearance. This meant that his baggage 
was to be checked. As far as the Custom's officers were concerned he was 
detained when he was referred. As he did, in all aspects, fit the profile 
of a drug courier and did in addition return from a very short stay in a 
"source" country the accused was asked if he objected to a personal 
search. This came after he was asked to read the provisions of the Customs 
Act which empower custom officers to conduct such searches and also gives 
the suspect an option to have the decision to search reviewed by a chief 
officer for reasonable cause. The accused had not objected to the search. 
Five packages of white power Oater analyzed to be cocaine) were found 
inside the waistband of his trousers. The accused failed to say what the 
powder was but was arrested for bringing a narcotic into Canada. He was 
then, for the first time, informed of his right to counsel. Appealing his 
conviction for importing the accused claimed that: 
1. the personal search was unreasonable and not consented to; 
2. the evidence was obtained by means linked to an infringement of the 
accused's rights in that he was detained long before the arrest and 
was not informed of his rights to counsel; 
3. the provisions of the Customs Act empowering the officers to search 
are unconstitutional; and 
4. that based on the above, the evidence of the drugs being found on the 
accused should have been excluded. 
If one considers the letter of the Therens decision, and the fact that the 
search was warrantless it seemed inevitable that the B. C. Court of Appeal 
would allow the appeal. However, it did not and seems to have lawyered its 
way out of applying the apparent precedent established in the Therens 
case . The Court recognized that by the standards now set in Therens the 
accused was detained and should have been informed of his rights if the 
same situation would arise now. However, by the legal precedents valid at 
the time the search took place the accused was not detained. Although the 
Charter was the same then as it is now and perhaps ought to have been 
applied then the way our highest Court recently decreed, the officers acted 
* R. v. Gladstone - See page 21 of Volume 14 of this publication. 
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in good faith. There was no wilfulness or malice in the way they handled 
the accused and if there was an infringement of the accused's right it was 
not done with any intent. 
One could argue that this was also the case with the officers who processed 
Mr. Therens. They also complied with the law as it then was and yet the 
Supreme Court of Canada remarked that the failure to inform Therens of his 
right to Counsel was a flagrant infringement of Therens' right. Our B. C. 
Court of Appeal had an answer for that question. It observed that defence 
counsel had put in evidence a directive (in force at the time of the 
Therens' apprehension) to all police in the province of Saskatchewan, that 
persons under demand to give breath samples must be considered detained and 
must be told of their right to counsel. The B. C. Court of Appeal reasoned 
that it was the non compliance with that directive that must have caused 
the Supreme Court of Canada to say that the infringement was a flagrant 
one. No similar directive existed for the Custom's officers at the time 
and therefore the B. C. Courts could find that what was done by the 
Custom's officers was done in good faith. 
In addition, the B. C. Court of Appeal commented that the Therens decision 
does not say that when the authorities fail to advise a detained person of 
his right to counsel, exclusion of evidence is a must. It rather reasoned 
that where the charge is not one of considerable gravity and the infringe-
ment is flagrant, then exclusion is the sole remedy. 
A drinking driving offence which is usually prosecuted by way of summary 
conviction (that was the charge against Therens) or an importing of a 
narcotic differ immensely in terms of gravity. 
In conclusion the B. C. Court of Appeal reasoned to be sure that the 
Supreme Court of Canada had no intention to create a strict or automatic 
exclusionary rule. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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CARE AND CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE 
Regina v. Toews* Supreme Court of Canada, September 1985 
In 1981 (pre-Charter days) the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed a case 
where a Mr. Ford, at trial, was acquitted of "over 80 mlg." while having 
the care and control of a motor vehicle**· Ford and his girlfriend 
attended an open air party. It was cold and the participants returned from 
time to time to their cars to get warmed up. Evidence showed that Ford had 
an arrangement that his girlfriend (who had refrained from drinking for 
that purpose) would drive the car afterwards. On one of their "warm·-up 
sessions", pol ice arrived and found Ford behind the wheel of his parked 
car; the engine was running to have the benefit of the car heater. The 
Supreme Court held that the girlfriend's testimony was merely a rebuttal of 
the presumption that Ford did have the care and control of the car; it fell 
short of establishing innocence. When an accused establishes that he 
mounted a vehicle for purposes other than driving, he simply shifts the 
burden of care or control back to the Crown to prove the essential ingredi-
ents of care and control. The presumption of care and control in s. 237 
C.C. is not exhaustive and was not enacted to import "an intention to 
drive" as an essential ingredient to "care and control". There are other 
means to prove care and control than by means of the presumption. A person 
can have care and control without having any intention to drive. Said the 
Supreme Court of Canada: 
"Care and control may be exercised without such intent 
where an accused performs some act or series of acts 
involving the use of the car, its fittings or equipment, 
such as occurred in this case, whereby the vehicle may 
unintentionally be set in motion, creating the danger the 
section is designed to prevent". 
In 1983 a Mr. Toews attended a party put on by a friend. He too had an 
arrangement to be driven home, but the contract did not come to fruition. 
Toews' pick-up truck was parked on the land of his host and as he felt he 
was in no condition to drive he crawled in a sleeping bag on the truck 
seat. His head was near the passenger door and his feet under the steering 
wheel. The key was in the ignition and in the courtesy position so the 
stereo would function. After four hours of sleep Toews was awakened by 
police and a conviction of "over 86 mlg." resulted. The B. C. Court of 
Appeal found that mounting a vehicle for the purpose of sleeping is differ-
ent from performing "acts involving the use of the car, its fittings, or 
equipment". Mr. Ford had used the equipment of the car (engine and heater) 
and therefore that case was distinct from what was to be considered 
* R. v. Toews, page 29 of Volume 11 of this publication. 
** Ford v. The Queen, page 23 of Volume 5 of this publication. 
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in this Toews' case. The accused had not wanted to use the vehicle as a 
motor vehicle but rather as a bedroom. Therefore, care and control was not 
proved and Toews was acquitted. 
It seems that the B. C. Court of Appeal maneuvered its way around the Ford 
decision. It would not be surprising if the justices of that Court were 
sympathetic towards Toews and felt that the police had used poor discretion 
in arresting him. It seems the law was not designed to prevent or remedy 
what occurred in this situation. However, the helpful Ford decision had 
been watered down for B. C. as "well enough" had not been left alone. The 
Crown appealed the acquittal to the Supreme Court of Canada which had to 
assess its own decision in the Ford case for post Charter validity. 
At the outset, the Supreme Court of Canada, reiterated the fundamentals 
established in the Ford decision. 
1. The wrongful act is the intentionally assuming of control of the motor 
vehicle; 
2. The absence of intent to drive does not afford a defence; 
3. Care and control must involve some use of the car, or its fittings or 
equipment or some conduct that would involve risk of putting the 
vehicle in motion. 
After 11 pages of reviewing law and reasoning, the Supreme Court of Canada 
concluded that what they decided in the Ford case is still the interpreta-
tion of the statutory presumption of care and control ~ 237 C.C.). 
Applying that interpretation to this Toews' scenario, he was not, in fact, 
and had not been, in control of his pick-up truck either by the provisions 
of s. 237 C.C. or the common law for the following reasons: 
1. the use (or lack of it) of the fittings or equipment of the car or any 
other conduct of the accused, did not involve a risk of putting the 
vehicle in motion; 
2. the accused had not occupied the driver's seat, therefore the presump-
tion ins. 237 C.C. did not apply and the Crown had to rely on 
evidence of acts of care and control; 
3. the accused was unconscious when found by police and there was no 
evidence of what occurred prior to their arrival; he was clearly not 
in control at that time; and 
4. all circumstances and evidence (particularly the accused being in a 
sleeping bag) supported the contention that the cab of the truck was 
merely used as a place to sleep. 
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The accused simply had no t committed the alleged act us reus (the wrongful 
or prohibited act) as he had not performed any acts amounting to assuming 
care or control of the truck. 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
* * * * * 
Comment: One cannot he l p but infer that there must have been other circum-
stances that lead to the arrest of Toews. My comments in Volume 29 are 
still valid in that this case has taken away from the supportive Ford 
decision. The Court's explanation of what does constitute care and control 
is now somewhat confusing. 
It is also inevitable that readers will wonder about the weight of the keys 
being in the ignition. Here is an implement requisite to operating the 
vehicle (and a common means of assuming care and control) inserted in a 
"fitting" of the truck that activates the major "instrument" of the truck 
as well as giving access (in most modern automobiles) to nearly all func-
tions including control of the gearshift lever. Here it appears, is where 
the lawyering by the judges came into play to acquit an accused caught in 
circumstances the law was not designed to remedy. 
Toews had not driven his pick-up truck to the party. 
this point: 
The Court said on 
"The evidence further revealed, and it was unquestioned, 
that the respondent had been driven by a frie'nd from his 
home... to the house... where his truck was parked and 
where the party was being held". 
Therefore, the accused was not the person who parked the truck where it was 
found and he was not the last driver. The Crown did not lead any evidence 
who placed the keys in the ignition or who turned the key in the courtesy 
position so the stereo would function. This meant that the Court could not 
draw any inference from "the key in the ignition" evidence that was adverse 
to the accused. 
The Supreme Court of Canada closed its reasons for judgement with this 
comment: 
" It has not been shown that the respondent (Toews) per-
formed any acts of care or control and he has therefore 
not performed the actus reus". 
* * * * * 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL - EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Dawson Court of Appeal of Yukon Territory, October 1985, 
Vancouver C.A. Registry Y40-83. 
Pol ice investigated the break, entry and theft of an office. A safe 
(containing $15,000) and some tools were taken. Two days after the offence 
pol ice arrested the accused (in an advanced state of intoxication) for the 
B & E. He was informed of his right to Counsel and he said he understood 
what he was told. It was late in the evening and the accused's attempts to 
contact a lawyer were in vain; he phoned six lawyers and only spoke to one 
who declined to act for him. He was placed in cells with the assurance 
that the investigating officer knew that a lawyer was to be contacted. Not 
at any time did the accused ask for a phone or mention he wanted a lawyer. 
In the middle of the night the accused was taken out of cells and inter-
viewed. His condition was such that the interview was impossible. Thir-
teen minutes later he was back in his cell until about midmorning when he 
was interviewed again. He was not again informed of his right to counsel. 
He was obviously "hung-over" but did nonetheless deny any knowledge of the 
B & E. Five interviews were conducted and in the late afternoon he, in 
answer to: "Let's get things cleared so everyone can get on their way" 
took pol ice to where some of the proceeds of the crime were kept. The 
accused also gave answers to leading questions when told that he would be 
released "once we get all this over with". 
The trial judge would not al low the statement by the accused in evidence 
and found that: 
1. the accused did not understand that he had a right to counsel; 
2. the accused was not given a reasonable opportunity to retain and 
instruct counsel; and 
3. the police had been negligent in respect to their constitutional 
mandate. 
The Court would not allow the evidence of what was found at the place where 
the accused took police. He did so awarding the accused a remedy pursuant 
to s . 24(1) of the Charter. This avoided a decision whether the adminis-
tration of justice would be brought into disrepute. If, despite their 
negligence, the officers had acted in good faith, did not need considera-
tion under s. 24(1) of the Charter. Having excluded all the statements and 
evidence there was nothing left to consider and the accused was acquitted. 
The Crown appealed this acquittal. The tenor of the reasons for judgement 
by the Court of Appeal are nearly harsh and quite critical of the trial 
judge'~ findings and rulings on various points of law. 
The Court of Appeal mainly discussed the propriety of excluding evidence as 
a remedy to an infringement of a right or freedom under s. 24(1) of the 
Charter. The Justices also discussed whether disallowing a statement 
because of a Charter infringement would mean that all subsequent evidence 
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(the finding of stolen property upon direction of the accused) must be 
excluded as well. They implied that this was erroneous in law. On the 
first point the Court pointed out that the Supreme Court of Canada* had, by 
a good majority, decided that s. 24(1) of the Charter was not appropriate 
to use for the exclusion of evidence. Good faith on the part of police and 
disrepute of the administration of justice must be considered. Further-
more, the specificity of s. 24(2) of the Charter made it the only subsec-
tion to use for the purpose of excluding evidence. 
The Court of Appeal also seemed to have doubts if police had violated the 
accused's right to counsel. The Court agreed with a decision made by their 
Ontario counterpart** which held that in respect to s. lO(b) of the Charter 
(informing a detained person of his right to counsel) a peace officer must: 
1. communicate clearly to the detainee that he has a right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay; 
2. make certain that detainee understands that right considering the 
mental condition of that person (handicap, shock, drunkenness, etc.); 
and 
3. if the detainee indicates in any manner that he chooses to invoke that 
right, he must: (a) accommodate the detainee with an opportunity to 
do so; and (b) cease questionning the prisoner until after the oppor-
tunity has been provided. 
If the detainee does not request such an opportunity and speaks to the 
peace officer, the statement obtained is. !!.£!_ inconsistent with the 
Charter. The Court seemed to have difficulty in agreeing with the trial 
judge that the officers had infringed the accused's rights or had been 
negligent in respect to those rights. From the evidence, the Court could 
not draw the same inferrences as the trial judge did. 
In respect to the voluntariness of the statement, the Court of Appeal found 
that the trial judge had concluded that when the accused asked when he 
would be released the officers had implied a threat or a promise that he 
would not be released unless he confessed. If that was so, the exclusion 
of the statements because of involuntariness was correct but did that mean 
that the subsequent facts (the stolen goods) also had to be excluded? 
Mainly because of the exclusion of evidence was granted to the accused as a 




the Crown' s appeal was al lowed and a new tr ia 1 
was ordered. 
* * * * * 
R. v. Therens page 1 of Volume 21 of this publication. 
~v. Anderson (1984) 45 Ontario Reports (2d) 225 . 
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ENTRAPMENT 
Is entrapment available as a defence or is it an aspect of "abuse of the 
process of the Court"? 
Regina v. Mack B. C. Court of Appeal, November 1985, CA000997. 
To state it as basically as possible, entrapment was not a defence in 
Canadian criminal law. When agents of the state hadenticed a person to 
connnit an offence, then, if their methods were so repulsive that trying the 
entrapped person for that offence would bring disrepute on the Courts, the 
judiciary were obliged to preserve the dignity of the Court and prevent the 
abuse of its process by ordering a stay of proceedings. In 1977 a decision 
by the Supreme Court of Canada* created some doubts about the Court's 
discretion to stay proceedings, particularly in respect to Courts of infer-
ior jurisdiction. Subsequently, decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in 1979** and 1985*** seemed to create the defence of entrapment or at 
least, made it an aspect of the abuse of process and entrenched "abuse of 
process" in the criminal law respectively. In some provinces the defence 
of entrapment has been available since the 1979 decision, while Courts in 
other Provinces have held that the Supreme Court of Canada did not quite go 
that far. When this Mack case reached the B. C. Court of Appeal it had to 
determine by applying and interpreting the rulings by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Jewitt case, what the remedy for entrapment is and what the 
procedural requirements are. 
Before attempting to explain the Mack decision by the B. C. Court of 
Appeal, it seems essential to explore the issues in the recent Jewitt case 
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Mack case is, in fact, B. C.'s 
reaction to the fundamentals established by the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Jewitt. In the Mack case a number of interesting 
questions relevant to entrapment were placed before the B. C. Court of 
Appeal. If, therefore, this is to explain anything, sequence is important. 
Regina v. Jewitt - Supreme Court of Canada, September 1985. 
Jewitt was tried for selling a pound of marihuana to an undercover police 
officer. He had done so upon persuasion by a person working with police. 
When tried by a B. C. County Court jury, the trial judge had held that the 
* Rourke v. The ueen (1977) 35 C.C.C. (2d) 129. 
** R. v. Amato 1979 51 CC.C. (2d) 401 (Seems to create the defence of 
entrapment). 
*** R. v. Jewitt (unreported Sept. 1985). 
fEntrenched abuse of process in criminal law). 
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defence of entrapment 1s available 1n Canada and instructed the jury to 
decide if Jewitt had been unlawfully entrapped. The Jury said he had been, 
and the trial judge~ to prevent the process of the Court from being abused, 
ordered that a stay of proceedings be entered on the record. The Attorney 
General of B. C. appealed this decision but the B. C. Court of Appeal 
found that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter as a stay of 
proceedings is not an acquittal (see s. 60S(l)(c) C.C.). The Attorney 
General then took the matter to the Supreme Court of Canada to decide if 
the trial judge had authority to stay the proceedings and if a judicial 
stay of proceedings is the equivalent of an acquittal and can be appealed 
as such. 
Firstly the Supreme Court of Canada shed some light on its own decisions 
that had made uncertain if the courts had any jurisdiction of "controlling 
prosecution behaviour which operates prejudicially to accused persons". 
This, of course, was the doctrine fundamental to the court's discretion to 
stay proceedings. Particularly one decision in 1978* created outright 
confusion on this issue and the provincial courts of appeal have been all 
over the place on this doctrine. The Jewitt case was the Supreme Court's 
opportunity to clarify it s views. Needless to say, that entrapment is 
nearly always the issue. After all these years of confusion the Supreme 
Court said: 
"It seems to me desirable and timely to end the uncertain-
ty which surrounds the availability of a stay of proceed-
ings to remedy abuse of process". 
Having said this, the Supreme Court of Canada entrenched "abuse of process" 
1n criminal proceedings by holding: 
"I would adopt... and affirm that 'there is a residual 
discretion in a trial court judge to stay proceedings 
where compel 1 ing an accused to stand trial would violate 
those fundamental principles of justice which underlie the 
community's sense of fair play and decency and to prevent 
the abuse of the court's process through oppressive or 
vexatious proceedings' • I would al so adopt the caveat ••• 
that this is a power which can be exercised only in the 
'clearest of cases'". 
The Supreme Court of Canada also held that a judicial stay of proceedings 
for abuse of process is the equivalent to an acquittal and that the provin-
cial courts of appeal have jurisdiction to deal with such a stay under s. 
60 5 (1 )( a) C • C. 
* Bourke v. The Queen [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1021 . 
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Now back to the Mack case before the B. C. Court of Appeal. Mack, the 
accused, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking. He claimed that he was entrapped and asked the highest 
court in B. C. if entrapment is a defence or an aspect of the abuse of 
process; is the onus to prove entrapment on the accused or must the Crown 
show there was no entrapment; and, of course, what is entrapment and was 
there entrapment in this case? 
The facts in this case unfolded from the Crown's evidence but it seems that 
on the issue of entrapment most details came from the accused's testimony. 
A Mr. M. from Ontario was placed under police handlers in B. C. in their 
investigation of the accused. Police officers conceded that M. was diffi-
cult to handle. He apparently had his own ideas on how to collect the 
evidence. The B. C. Court of Appeal concluded that if the onus of proof 
beyond a reasonable ground was on the Crown to show that there was no 
entrapment then the Court would have a reasonable doubt that the methods 
adopted were free of entrapment . 
The accused had been approached by M. to become a supplier of drugs but was 
rejected. After another solicitation the accused had asked to be left 
alone, but the phone calls persisted. The accused testified that he was 
eventually terrified of M. and had kept a "rendezvous" out of fear. On one 
occasion M. took the accused for a walk in the woods and produced a gun and 
had said "a person could get lost". M. had referred to the remote area 
they were in. On another occasion M. had sunnnoned the accused to a hotel 
room. pn route, he had been followed, said the accused. M. also had other 
men with him which the accused took to be associates of the illegal syndi-
cate M. had implied he headed up. The accused testified that he finally 
had given in and had gone to a supplier of drugs he then knew (the supplier 
had died by the time of trial) and to provide as much cocaine as he could 
for him around $40 ,000 per pound. This, he had told the supplier, was 
strictly to get M. off his back. A 12 oz. sample was taken to M. by the 
accused. This delivery resulted in the accused's arrest. 
The trial judge had concluded that the accused's involvement was for profit 
and not out of- fear or because of persistent inducement on the part of M. 
Police had simply provided an opportunity for the accused, a man with a 
lengthy criminal record and a propensity for such transactions. He had not 
been forced into doing anything he did not want to do. This (along with 
the specific questions he put to the Court in relation to entrapment) is 
what the accused challenged. 
Considering the trend created by the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the B. C. Court of Appeal held, in respect to its previous views 
that entrapment could not be used to stay proceedings, that 
" we must now reject this view and conclude that 
entrapment is available as a defence, not in the normal 
sense of that word, but as an aspect of abuse of process" . 
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The Court concluded that when the entrapment scheme is so shocking and 
outrageous (please note that this was not considered under the Charter to 
remedy infringements of rights or freedoms) as to bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute then the Crown is disentitled to a conviction 
despite the fact that on the merits the accused may not be entitled to an 
acquittal. 
Some very interesting aspects of entrapment were discussed in these reasons 
for judgement. In the U. S. the matter of subjectivity v. objectivity had 
been debated some time ago. The distinction is that when the test is an 
objective one, then the actions of the authorities are considered in isola-
tion to determine if there was entrapment. If the test is a subjective one 
then the predisposition of the accused may justify the methods used. 
Despite some precedents, the tendency of many courts in the U. S. is to 
apply the objective test. If a subjective test is applied then entrapment 
is a question of fact and a jury (judge of the facts) should decide if the 
accused was entrapped. If the test is objective, then entrapment is a 
question of law and a judge must decide the issue. A problem, of course, 
is that if entrapment is an abuse of the process of the Court, it ought to 
be exclusively within the ambit of the judiciary to decide on, like all 
other issues related to the process of the Court. It seems to follow then, 
that if entrapment must be decided subjectively (by a jury) then one could 
reason that it is a substantive defence. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal decided that entrapment is a question of law and 
must be determined by a judge. In other words entrapment is not a substan-
tive defence, but an aspect of abuse of process which may result in a 
judicial stay of prosecution. 
Is the onus to show entrapment on the accused or must the crown as an 
essential ingredient to its case show that there was no entrapment? 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that an accused who does not claim he is 
innocent on the merits, but claims that the trial should not continue 
because the outragious and shocking practices of the state (by means of 
which he was entrapped to commit the alleged offence) would bring disrepute 
on the administration of justice (like is required for the exclusionary 
rule under the Charter) 
" ••. should have the responsibility of establishing on a 
preponderance of evidence 
or its representatives 
process". 
that the conduct of the police 
is an abuse of the court ' s 
The Court also agreed with the trial judge that there was no entrapment in 
this case. It quoted from the trial judge Is reasons why the accused had 
become involved to reap profits rather than out of fear and inducement. 
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"Given his record and the alacrity with which he produced 
on seeing the $50,000 •••. I find it more probable that he 
then saw a situation of profit and acted upon it". 
Though an opportunity had been created by pol ice for the accused to be 
involved, the tactics 
" fall short of entrapping a person into the commission 
of an act that he had no intention of doing". 
(Reason for my emphasis are in my comments following). 
In summary: 
1. Entrapment is available as a defence but only as an aspect of an abuse 
of process; 
2. Entrapment is a question of law and not a question of fact (to be 
decided by a judge and not a jury); and 
3. Entrapment must be established by the accused on the balance of proba-
bilities; and 
4. Entrapment can only result in the exercise of the power to enter a 
stay of proceedings in "the clearest cases". 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Comment: It does seem accurate to say that the definition of entrapment is 
unchanged but not its application. In essence, creating an opportunity for 
a person to commit a crime he is predisposed to commit is not necessarily 
entrapment. 
The Court of Appeal opted for the objective test to determine whether there 
was entrapment. In the manner in which the justices reasoned they accepted 
entrapment as a defence as an aspect of an abuse of process rather than as 
a substantive defence as it is in the U. S. 
As explained above, when you apply the objective test the actions of police 
must be weighed in isolation from the predisposition, inclinations, propen-
sities or activities of the accused. From the Crown's point of view, that 
may be the only down side to the objective test. Our B. C. Court of 
Appeal, however, reasoned that the U. S. approach does not completely 
ignore the predisposition of the accused. Furthermore it found support in 
the Supreme Court of Canada giving some indication that the accused's 
propensities could not be ignored. By agreeing with the trial judge's 
reasoning in determining that there was no entrapment in this case, and 
quoting those portions of his reasons for judgement that took the accused's 
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record s , alacrity and intention into account, it seems safe to say that our 
B. C. Court of Appeal has included "predisposition" in the objective test 
to determine whether there was entrapment. 
It seems also significant that the Supreme Court of Canada did not say 
(like some judges did) that the judiciary have an inherent right to ~tect 
the abuse of the processe s of the court but only have a "residual discre-
tion" to do so. In some previous cases the superior courts have expressed 
a concern that judicial interference in prosecutions would lead to abuses. 
After al 1, the persons accused who have been entrapped are, 1 ikely on the 
merits, guilty of the alleged crime. It is in certain ways, like the 
exclusionary rule, imposiug discipline on authorities by excusing the 
offender for his wrongdoing. Possibly our judiciary have feared absurd 
definitions, rulings and consequences. Al though this is conjecture on my 
part, by assuming to have "residual discretion" only, the Court may 
envision parliament's intervention in the event of judicial abuses. By 
saying that the discretion is "residual" the Court seems to concede that 
the judiciary only have this power as it has not been assigned or has not 
been defined or provided for in any statute. Unless specifically super-
seded by our elected representatives the judiciary are the creators and in 
charge of the process of the court. This means that anything not provided 
by our law makers is "residue" and within the ambit of the judges. 
The apparent fear of possible consequences of this "abuse of process" 
issue, we may not be able to afford in our fallible society, is also 
reflected by the emphasis by the Supreme Court of Canada, that this 
judicial discretion may only be exercised in the "clearest of cases". 
Again this seems to warn those of the judiciary inclined to create legal 
luxuries we cannot afford this side of the pearly gates, not to get carried 
away with this new law. 
Finally, it may be of interest to note that nearly all cases historical to 
this landmark decision by the Supreme Court of Canada originated in B. C. 
* * * * * 
- 35 -
B. C. TRAFFIC VIOLATION REPORTS AND THE CHARTER 
Regina v. Langhorne and Regina v. Boshard, B. C. Provincial Court, 
Vancouver, B. C. November 1985, Al454708 and Al430060, respectively. 
Recently, concern has been expressed by members about some apparent techni -
cal points in law that rendered traffic violation reports invalid. Some 
rather puzzling rulings in our local Traffic Court triggered this concern. 
Both accused apparently appeared on the same day before the same Provincial 
Court Judge. Both were represented by the same counsel. Mr. Langhorne and 
Mr. Boshard received a TVR which could result in demerit points being 
registered against their B. C. Driver's Licences. This, in turn, would 
mean increased insurance premiums and possibly suspension of the driver's 
licences. 
Mr. Langhorne, who was dealt with first, argued that the traffic laws were 
aimed at all drivers on British Columbia highways. Yet a person from out 
of province who drives on our highways, would receive a TTI, pay a fine or 
plead not guilty, and, without having to deposit any funds, have a right to 
be tried. Mr. Langhorne claimed that this was discriminatory. The judge 
imposed a stay of proceedings to remedy the unconstitutional discrimination 
Mr. Langhorne was the victim of. 
Seemingly, a little later in the day, Mr. Boshard challenged the validity 
of the TVR served on him. In addition to the arguments advanced in the 
Langhorne case, Mr. Boshard claimed that the prov1s1ons of the Motor 
Vehicle Act which require that $10 be deposited by a person who wishes to 
dispute the alleged traffic violation is contrary to the Charter. He 
claimed to have a right to a trial, and, despite the fact that the deposit 
would be returned upon his appearance for the hearing, he still had to 
purchase that right. This provision also discriminates against impoverized 
citizens he claimed. He also argued that the provisions create inequality 
"before and under the law", which, of course, is also contrary to the 
Charter. The trial judge rejected al 1 of Mr. Boshard' s Charter arguments 
but concluded that he was at least entitled to a stay of proceedings as was 
entered on the records for Mr. Langhorne. 
There seems little doubt that the government either has to make some signi-
ficant amendments to the Motor Vehic.le Act or has to challenge the consti-
tutional arguments that were advanced 1n these cases. For numerous 
reasons, the latter is predicted. 
* * * * * 
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DEMAND - DETENTION - REFUSAL - RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Regina v. MacKinnon 21 C.C.C. (3d) 264 
Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, Appeal Division 
The accused, who rode a motorcycle was stopped and a demand for breath 
samples was made of him while he sat in the rear of the pol ice car. The 
accused promptly refused and the officer considered this to be the end of 
the matter. He drove the accused to his girlfriend and issued an Appear-
ance Notice for refusing to comply with the demand. The accused was 
acquitted and the Crown appealed. 
Needless to say that the Therens decision* by t he Supreme Court of Canada 
was relied on heavily by the defence. Therens had complied with the demand 
but had at no time been informed of his rights to counsel. The Supreme 
Court of Canada held that when a demand is made of a person to supply 
samples of breath he or she is detained and must consequently be informed 
of the right to counsel. 
The Crown argued that the circumstances in this MacKinnon case made it 
distinct from Therens. Figuretively speaking, the immediate response to 
the demand was "No" and the officer's reaction was "O.K." in that case you 
must appear to plead to the offence of refusing and I'll drive you to where 
you want to go". At what point in time was there detention? 
The Appeal Division of the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court disagreed 
with the Crown's submissions. It held that detention came the moment the 
demand was conveyed to the accused. He had a decision to make; compliance 
would probably lead to prosecution and so would refusal. The accused made 
that decision without the benefit of being informed of his right to firstly 
consult counsel. The Court held that the infringement of the accused's 
right had given him a reasonable excuse (as per s. 235(2) C.C.) to refuse 
giving breath samples. 
Crown's appeal dismissed. 
* * * * * 
* See page 1 of Volume 21 of this publication (1985) 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 . 
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LEGAL TID BITS 
Possession For the Purpose .•• 
The Ontario Court of Appeal had to decide whether the accused should stand 
trial for possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking. Her connnit-
tal for trial had been quashed. A quantity of narcotics, sufficient to 
infer that they were for the purpose of trafficking, were found in the 
accused's bedroom which she shared with her boyfriend. They were charged 
jointly but apparently there was no proof that the accused owned the 
narcotics. Most of the evidence had identified the boyfriend as the person 
who brought the contraband into the apartment and distributed it among his 
customers. 
The Court reasoned that the narcotics were in the accused's bedroom with 
her consent. The power to so consent or to withhold or withdraw that 
consent may amount to control over the narcotics. She therefore did 
possess the narcotics (see s. 3(4) C.C.) and was a party to the offence. 
Connnittal for trial restored. 
20 C.C.C. (3d) 440. Chambers and the Queen. 
* * * * * 
Alibi 
The accused appealed his conviction of break, enter and theft. After 
connnittal for trial upon the preliminary hearing he gave police all 
particulars of an alibi, including the identity of witnesses who could 
verify it. The trial judge told the jury, that if they believed the 
accused and his witnesses in respect to the alibi they had to render a 
verdict of not guilty. If they did not accept that evidence they had to 
consider the Crown's evidence only to determine their verdict. The trial 
judge had also told the jury that they should take in consideration the 
late disclosure of an alibi by the accused. "Why did he not right off tell 
police that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime"? 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had given inadequate 
instruction to the jury. He should also have told them that if they had 
doubts about the accused's alibi, they should acquit him. 
Furthermore, late disclosure of an alibi, is not detrimental to an accused 
unless he gives it when there is inadequate time to investigate it. No 
inference of guilt may be drawn from failure to disclose an alibi. Cross 
examination by Crown Counsel on this point had demeaned the accused's right 
to remain silent and had left the impression with the jury that he was 
obliged to disclose his alibi at the earliest possible moment. 
New trial ordered. 
20 C.C.C. (3d) 184 Regina v. Parrington 
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Strip Search 
The accused had been properly arrested for theft of groceries from an 
apartment. She was turned over to a policewoman who, as a matter of 
routine and policy, had strip searched the accused. Marijuana was found on 
her and she was charged accordingly. The groceries had already been 
recovered at her home and the accused argued that the strip search had been 
excessive and unreasonable. Consequently the marijuana found on her should 
be inadmissible in evidence. The trial judge had gone along and acquitted 
the accused. The Crown appealed to no avail, to the Ontario High Court of 
Justice. Although police are empowered to search an arrested person for 
evidence or anything with which the prisoner may do harm or make good an 
escape, that power is not unlimited or immune from the test of reasonable-
ness as stipulated in s. 8 of the Charter. A perfectly lawful search can 
by its extent or manner be unreasonable, after all, the Charter does not 
only control the content but also the application of law. An ordinary 
search would have been justified in these circumstances. Ther.e wer~ no 
grounds that would make the finding of evidence or weapons on the accused a 
probability. This rendered the routine strip search excessive and 
unreasonable. As the community is not prepared to accept routine searches 
or arrest, acceptance of the evidence found on the accused by means of the 
unreasonable search would bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute. 
Crown's appeal dismissed. Acquittal uphe ld. 
20 C. C.C. (3d) 180. Regina v. Morrison. 
* * * * * 
Intercepting Communications/Public Telephone 
Police were authorized to intercept the accused's communications at any 
place he resorted to. He was seen to use the same public telephone several 
times and when they intercepted the accused's communications via that phone 
valuable evidence was discovered. When this evidence was adduced at his 
trial he objected claiming that "any place he may resort to" is too broad. 
For instance, should a person mentioned in an authorization use a public 
phone once, then the innocent public may have its communication intercepted 
by the authorities. The B. C. Court of Appeal rejected the defence argu-
ments and held that specificity is not required of the Crown in regards to 
what telephone may be tapped. Parliament recognizes that innocent conver-
sations will be intercepted. However, the remedy lies in the trial 
proceedings where those communications can be rejected as irrelevant. 
Crown's appeal allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
20 C.C.C. (~d) 173. Regina v. Leclerc. 
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Civil Action to Have Funds Seized Under N.C.A. Restituted 
The accused applied under s. 10(5) of the Narcotic Control Act for return 
of money seized from him pursuant to 10( 1) of that Act. His application 
was denied and he then took civil action based on a right to ownership of 
the money. The Federal Court held that when an application under s, 10 
N.C.A. is denied, the applicant is estopped from taking civil action to get 
the money. 
Aimonetti v. The Queen 19 C.C.C. (3d) 481. 
* * * * * 
Drunkenness and Assault 
The accused appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily 
harm. He claimed that he was too drunk to comprehend what he was doing and 
therefore could not form the specific intent to commit the assault. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the conviction by ruling that the offence is 
one of general intent and self induced drunkenness is not an available 
defence. 
Regina v. Bernard 18 C.C.C. (3d) 574. 
* * * * * 
Burden of Proof re Admissibility of Statement 
The accused was arrested at gun point for armed robbery. He had made a 
statement and at his trial a voir dire was conducted to determine the 
admissibility of the statement. Police testified how they had placed the 
accused under arrest , told him what the charge was, and also informed him 
of his right to counsel. The accused testified that if he was told of his 
rights it had not penetrated. He had also asked to be-g'iven an opportunity 
to phone his lawyer, but he was refused. The trial judge had not rendered 
judgement. He simply held that the Crown had failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused's rights had not been infringed and 
excluded the accused's confession (please note that the issue was not 
voluntariness) under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
The Crown appealed to the Manitoba Court of Appeal which held that to have 
a statement admitted in evidence the burden of proof is on the Crown to 
prove ~eyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary. However, 
where the defence seeks exclusion of a statement because the accused's 
rights were denied him or infringed, the burden of proof is on the defence 
to prove on the balance of probabilities that there was such denial or 
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infringement. Despite the trial judge ' s error the Court of Appeal inferred 
from the transcript of the trial that the accused's testimony had, in fact, 
showed to the judge on the balance of probabilities that he had been denied 
his right to counsel. That would have brought the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Therefore, despite the error in law by the trial 
judge, the Crown's appeal was dismissed and the acquittal was upheld. 
Regina v. Lundrigan 19 C.C.C. (3d) 490. 
* * * * * 
Specificity in Information re Trafficking 
The accused was charged that he "did unlawfully traffic in a narcotic, to 
wit: cocaine "contrary to s. 40 of the Narcotic Control Act". 
The trial judge quashed the indictment for want of specificity in that it 
did not say in what manner the accused did traffic. As the quashing was 
done for want of detail and not as a determination of the charge on the 
merits, it was not the equivalent to an acquittal and therefore the Crown 
could not appeal the decision (see s. 60S(l)(a) C.C.). The only way open 
to the Crown was to apply to the Supreme Court of B. C. for an order 
compelling the Provincial Court Judge to proceed with the trial. In its 
application the Crown claimed that the indictment was adequate and even if 
it was not, the Judge should have given the opportunity for the Crown to 
amend it. 
The defence simply submitted that the Supreme Court in these circumstances 
could not issue the order the Crown sought. The Supreme Court held it 
could and did. The indictment did not need to set out the nature or method 
of the trafficking (see R. v. Peebles (1975) 24 C.C.C. (2d) 144. B. C. 
Court of Appeal). 
The Attorney General and Judge Govan of tqe Provincial Court of B. C. 
Vancouver Registry CC 850472. 
* * * * * 
Sufficiency of One Fingerprint 
The accused escaped from a correctional institute and at about the same 
time a car was stolen from nearby. The car was found abandoned and one 
fingerprint belonging to the accused was found on the rearview mirror. Was 
this sufficient to hold that the accused had stolen the car? The County 
Court of Vancouver Island held that it was. Considering the irresistable 
inference one must draw from the facts, opportunity and circumstances, the 
one only fingerprint is overwhelming. The evidence was simply consistent 
with guilt and inconcistent with any other rational conclusion. 
Regina v. March June 1985, Victoria Registry 3600 1 
* * * * * 
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Inference from Quantity of Drug Transported 
The accused who consumes a certain drug at the rate of "one hit a week" had 
a large enough quantity of it on his person when he entered Canada, that it 
would last him for years. He told the Court that he had run int o a real 
bargain in San Francisco and had purchased such a quantity strictly for his 
own personal use. 
He was charged with possession and trafficking. The Court had to infer 
that the transport of the drug amounted to trafficking or that the quantity 
justified a finding that he possessed the drug for that purpose of traf-
ficking. In regards to the former, the Court held that it would have to be 
shown that the purpose of the transportation was delivery or disposition to 
third parties. There was no such evidence. In respect to the latter, the 
Vancouver Island County Court held not to have any reason not to believe 
the accused. "Consequently, I am unable to say that the charge of traf-
ficking has been proved". 
Regina v. Plant County Court of Vancouver Island, May 1985, Victoria 34383. 
* * * * * 
Reasonable Search/Right to Counsel 
While on patrol in a marked up police car, the officer saw a group of 
youths, some of whom were drinking beer. The officer talked to them and 
took the accused aside to take particulars. He observed a bulge under the 
accused's shirt and poked at it with his pen believing it was a bottle or 
can contai.ning an alcoholic beverage • As the bulge gave way he looked 
under the shirt and saw plastic. When he pulled it out he found it to be a 
bag containing smaller bags of marihuana. Because of what the accused 
said, and the packaging, he was charged with possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. Defence counsel claimed that the bag had been found by 
unreasonable search contrary to the Charter. She claimed there was no 
authority to search the accused. The Court held that in the circumstances, 
sections 42 and 67 of the B. C. Liquor Control and Licensing Act had made 
the search lawful while there was nothing unreasonable about it. The 
police officer, although he had informed the accused of his right, had not 
provided him with a phone and phonebook and had thereby violated the 
accused's right to counsel, said his lawyer. The Court observed that the 
accused had not asked for such opportunity or indicated that he wanted to 
phone a lawyer and held that police do not have to go as far as the defence 
lawyer suggested. In any event, even if there were Charter infringements, 
the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute by 
admitting the evidence. Accused was convicted. 
R. v. Miller February 1985, Victoria Registry 34557. 
* * * * * 
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Lawyer Phoning to Assist Client 
The accused, under demand to give a sample of breath, accompanied police to 
the station. The accused's wife phoned a lawyer who, in turn phoned 
police. He identified himself as the accused's lawyer, and said he called 
to assist his client. He was told that the accused could not come to the 
phone but would phone him back. From memory the lawyer claims he waited 30 
minutes (approximately) for the cal 1. It was found as a fact that the 
accused returned the cal 1 between the two breath samples he gave. This 
showed on the balance of probabilities that the message to the accused was 
delayed and therefore his right to counsel without delay was infringed. 
However, had pol ice intended to infringe the accused's right, they would 
have delayed giving the message until after the second test was taken. 
Therefore, the administration of justice would not be brought into 
disrepute if the evidence was admitted reasoned the trial judge, and he 
convicted for "over 80 mlg. ". The accused appealed, strongly arguing that 
the trial judge was wrong and that no value may be attached to the fact 
that after his consultation with his lawyer he still gave a second sample 
of breath. 
The County Court of Westminster found counsel's attitude on the phone had 
not placed any urgency on the matter. Perhaps there was some tardiness in 
relaying a message, but no infringement of a right, held the Court. There 
was nothing "flagrant" (R. v. Therens) about the police actions. Appeal 
dismissed. 
R. v. Topping June 1985, New Westminster Registry X015394. 
* * * * * 
Rented Video Equipment - Theft by Conversion 
Within one week the accused rented, from two different out lets, a video 
recorder. The first one by using someone else ' s identification. He pawned 
both machines. One of them was pawned by hi s taxi-driver, The contract 
with the video shops provided for additional rental fees for each addition-
al day he kept the machine and the pawn-broker's contracts gave the client 
30 days to redeem the article upon payment of the outstanding amount, The 
accused was arrested on two counts of theft prior to the expiration of the 
30 day period. He claimed that he had every intention of redeeming the 
machines prior to the due date, return them to the video out lets and pay 
the accumulated rental fees. Defence counsel claimed that the Crown could 
not prove fraudulent intent for this "theft by conversion" al legations, 
despite the accused's total inability (from a financial point of view) to 
do as he said he intended to. After an interesting reasoning by the Court 
dealing with whether conversion to his own use had been complete at the 
time of arrest and the misrepresentations with regard to rented equipment , 
the accused was convicted of both counts. 
!• v. Hyndman County Court of Vancouver Island, September 30, 1985, 
Victoria Registry 35346. 
* * * * * 
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Police Board's Discretion to Conduct Public Enquiry 
Section 40 of the B. C. Police Act seems to dictate that a Police Board at 
a certain stage of the disciplinary process shall conduct a public inquiry 
when requested to do so by a person who complained of a disciplinary 
default against a municipal constable. At least, the language of the 
section is compel 1 ing throughout. The Supreme Court of B. C., however, 
held that since the complainant must set out the reasons for the request, 
the Police Board has discretion in the matter. It made this ruling upon a 
petition by the municipal constable complained about, for an order to quash 
the order for his conduct to be subject to a public inquiry. 
The constable had been charged criminally as a result of the incident 
complained about, and a public trial during which no less than 24 witnesses 
testified (including the complainant) was conducted. In view of the 
discretion the Police Board has, and the fact that the constable's acquit-
tal was on the merits, the Court granted the order. 
Between S. J. Wood and the Attorney General et. al. November 1985, 
Vancouver Registry CC851161. 
* * * * * 
